

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FOURTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 2 November 1967, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. E. L. M. BURNS (Canada)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA
Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE
Mr. J. NOGUEIRA FILHO

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Burma:

U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL
Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Mr. A. BERNIER

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. P. WINKLER
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. J. STRUCKA

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELIKE

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI
Mr. N. KRISHNAN
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. R. CARACCIOLI
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI
Mr. E. FRANCO
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. J. CASTANEDA
Miss E. AGUIRRE

Nigeria:

Alhaji SULE KOLO
Mr. B.O. TONWE

Poland:

Mr. A. CZARKOWSKI
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBESCO
Mr. O. IONESCO
Mr. C. GEORGESCO
Mr. A. COROLANU

Sweden:

Mr. A. EDELSTAM
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALAF
Mr. O. SIRRY
Mr. M. SHAKER

United Kingdom:

Sir Harold BEELEY
Mr. I.F. PORTER
Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. S. DePALMA
Mr. C.G. BREAM
Mr. R.W. DREXLER

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I declare open the 344th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
2. Alhaji SULE KOLO (Nigeria): Since the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union tabled their draft treaty texts (ENDC/192, 193) in this Committee, many other delegations, including my own, have made certain comments and presented specific proposals aimed at making the final draft treaty acceptable to the overwhelming majority of States.
3. The Nigerian delegation believes that we should aim at a balanced treaty because anything less is unlikely to receive the support of the majority of States. We believe that the delegations which have made concrete proposals since 24 August have done so in good faith, with the aim of safeguarding essential national and international interest and principles. There is no doubt that the achievement of a non-proliferation treaty is an urgent task. The urgency arises from the importance of the treaty, which also demands that we should pursue our task with perseverance and tolerance. In this connexion I should like to welcome the statements of representatives of the United States at our recent meetings in which they assured the Committee that the various proposals that have been made by delegations were being studied for the purpose of including them in the final draft treaty.
4. The Nigerian delegation is aware of the problem of reconciling the various views that have been presented in this Committee and is appreciative of the leading roles of the co-Chairmen in that regard. On the other hand, the Soviet and United States texts remain uncompleted, article III not having been introduced. Although the rest of the treaty will certainly be affected by the substance of that article on international control and safeguards, we thought that while waiting for the successful conclusion of negotiations on that article this Committee could move ahead and complete work on the other parts of the treaty.
5. As part of that pursuit, the Nigerian delegation would like to take a little further the preliminary comments it made (ENDC/PV.327) soon after the submission of the United States and USSR drafts. We are gratified to note that some of the ideas contained in our speech coincide with the views of other delegations, which have presented some of them in the form of amendments and working papers. We do not intend here to go over formulations with which we agree in the original drafts or in the

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working papers presented by other delegations since 24 August; but we feel it is our duty — and every member of this Committee has a similar duty — to present our ideas in treaty language where we believe that a change in the wording or emphasis of existing formulations would serve our purpose better.

6. The Nigerian delegation, conscious that a non-proliferation treaty of necessity imposes restrictions on a class of States, is anxious that the restrictions should not be such as to interfere with the legitimate activities and aspirations of peoples. For that reason the Nigerian delegation wishes to give its unqualified support to the principles embodied in the various proposals that have been advanced to strengthen article IV of the United States and Soviet draft.

7. It seems to us that the guiding principles behind the articles dealing with the prohibition of nuclear explosive devices on the one hand and the encouragement of development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes on the other must be fully understood. Articles I and II, which deal with non-dissemination, will if they stand in their present formulations impose extraordinary restrictions on non-nuclear-weapon States in the development of the science and technology of nuclear explosives. Consequently, if the articles are accepted by non-nuclear-weapon States, it will be at a price which, I dare say, no one can yet correctly estimate. As the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, rightly observed at our meeting of 23 February, there is the risk that the negative prophecies about the peaceful potentialities of nuclear explosions may be as short-sighted as the views of the distinguished members of the British Post Office who thought that, "owing to the abundant supply of messenger boys, the telephone would never be needed in England" (ENDC/PV.288, para. 20). I wonder how amused the representatives would have been today if the British Postmaster-General at that time had actually banned the introduction of telephones in Britain in order to maintain the full employment of messenger boys.

8. The Nigerian delegation believes that, in pursuing the task before us, we must not make the mistake of the British Post Office official. The article dealing with the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should therefore be as positive and precise as that dealing with the prohibition of nuclear explosive devices. The responsibility which will fall on the nuclear-weapon Powers in that regard is a direct

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consequence of the privilege conferred on them by articles I and II of the United States and USSR drafts. I think justice demands that those who retain the privilege to develop nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes should clearly undertake to make available to those who have renounced the privilege full details of the results of their research which could be useful for peaceful purposes in any area of the world.

9. In that connexion the Nigerian delegation wishes to make a clear difference between availability of the potential peaceful benefits of nuclear explosives and the technology which gives rise to those benefits. I think the aim of the non-privileged is not merely to receive benefits but also to acquire the technical know-how which will produce those benefits. We realize that research into peaceful uses of nuclear explosives is an expensive undertaking; but perhaps it is not so much more expensive than the undertaking not to conduct research at all in that direction. For the foregoing reasons the Nigerian delegation believes that article IV should be redrafted along the lines that I shall propose at the end of this statement.

10. In the meantime I should like to turn to the question of security. The Nigerian delegation has consistently emphasized the need to provide a "nuclear umbrella" for the signatories of a non-proliferation treaty until such time as nuclear weapons are eliminated from the arsenals of all countries. I must say that I have not been convinced by any arguments that have so far been advanced in this Committee against the introduction of that idea into a non-proliferation treaty. As I said in my last intervention, collective security arrangements in respect of nuclear threat or attack are as essential to a non-proliferation treaty as the collective security system is to the Charter of the United Nations. If the principle could be accepted for the Charter, I do not see why it cannot be accepted for a non-proliferation treaty.

11. It has been said that the Security Council already provides a universal guarantee against aggression. That is true in a general way, but we also know that it is not at all certain that all the nuclear Powers in the Security Council will sign this treaty. Furthermore, we should be over-stretching the Charter of the United Nations if we invested the Security Council with responsibilities which it was certainly not intended, or in a position, to shoulder. We have all seen wars fought with conventional weapons.

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since the Security Council came into being, without its being able to define the aggressor or, what is more, to repel his attack. Such a situation is bearable when the devastation can still be measured in terms of men and material, but not when the result will be the end of civilization and the disappearance of man from vast areas of the globe.

12. The use of nuclear weapons against anyone has been declared a crime against humanity (General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI)) because of the terrible damage it can cause to humanity. Indeed the aim of the treaty we are negotiating is to reduce the danger of nuclear war. By it some countries will be called upon to forswear the weapons for the security of the whole world. On the other hand, some will be allowed the privilege of keeping the deadly weapons until such time as an agreement can be reached on their general elimination. The argument for retaining that privilege is that nuclear weapons have a value as a deterrent against potential aggressors. The Nigerian delegation cannot see how that deterrent value can justly be denied to those who are being asked not to produce the weapons themselves.

13. Thus it seems to us indispensable that non-nuclear-weapon Powers signatory to a non-proliferation treaty be provided with guarantees by nuclear-weapon States against nuclear blackmail. We do not believe that that should entail membership of any alliance, for in any case a nuclear war will know no alliance. For that reason the Nigerian delegation will propose a paragraph for inclusion in the non-proliferation treaty along the lines shown in article IIIA of the working paper which I will present at the end of this intervention.

14. Now I should like to refer briefly to the question of amendments. It seems to us undemocratic that sovereign States voluntarily adhering to a treaty should have amendments imposed on them by what would amount to a minority of signatories -- which is what the veto would amount to for about thirty States. What is more, we believe that the subject matter of the treaty is too important and its ramifications too obscure for a State to commit itself in advance. In any case, if the votes of

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nuclear-weapon Powers and members of the Governing Board of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were all that were important, there would be no need to impose such amendments on those not belonging to that category. For those reasons I should like to support the idea already placed before the Committee by the representative of Romania that amendments to the treaty should come into force for all parties that have deposited their instruments of ratification (ENDC/199, p.2).

15. Finally, the Nigerian delegation would like to make an important addition to the article on withdrawal. The article speaks of "extraordinary events, related to the subject matter" of the treaty. I have the impression that the "extraordinary events" would be those that could not have been foreseen at the time of signature. On the other hand, the Nigerian delegation foresees many difficulties which could arise on substantive matters after signature. Consequently we would suggest that non-fulfilment and non-adherence, along the lines of article VII proposed in our working paper, should be explicitly declared to be grounds for withdrawal.

16. I should like to assure the Committee that the various proposals suggested by the Nigerian delegation today are aimed only at producing a treaty that is just and lasting. Some of the suggestions in the Nigerian working paper have been explained in this statement; others are based on my previous interventions or are self-explanatory. However, if necessary, the Nigerian delegation will further explain the contents of its working paper at a later date. I will now read the working paper:

"Article II A:

"Each nuclear weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes, if requested, to come to the aid of any non-nuclear weapon State which is threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons."

"Article IV A:

"Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to co-operate directly or through the IAEA, in good faith and according to its technological and/or material resources, with any other State or group of States Party to this Treaty in

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the development and advancement of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

"The nuclear weapon States Party to this Treaty shall make available, through the IAEA, to all non-nuclear weapon Parties, full scientific and technological information on the peaceful applications of nuclear energy accruing from research on nuclear explosive devices.

"The nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty shall also provide facilities for scientists from non-nuclear weapon countries Party to the Treaty to collaborate with their scientists working on nuclear explosive devices, in order to narrow the intellectual gap which will be created in that field as a result of restrictions imposed by this Treaty on non-nuclear weapon States.

"Article IVB:

"Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to communicate annually to the IAEA, full information on the nature, extent and results of its co-operation with any other Party or group of Parties, in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Reports so received by the IAEA shall be circulated by the Agency to all the Parties to the Treaty.

"Article IVC:

"Each Party to this Treaty shall take necessary legal and administrative steps to ensure that all organizations working on the development of nuclear energy in territory under its jurisdiction do so in conformity with the aims and provisions of the Treaty.

"Article VII:

"This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

"Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides:

"(a) that the aims of the Treaty are being frustrated;

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- "(b) that the failure by a State or group of States to adhere to the Treaty jeopardizes the existing or potential balance of power in its area, thereby threatening its security;
- "(c) any other extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.

"It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of reasons for withdrawal."

17. I should be grateful if this working paper could be circulated by the Secretariat as an official document of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.^{1/}
18. On a point of procedure: I should like to inform the Committee, particularly the co-Chairmen, that I have discussed with my colleagues from Berne the proposal to cancel the regular Tuesday meeting of the Committee on 7 November in honour of the Soviet National Day. The feeling is that a meeting could be held on Monday 6 November instead. Nevertheless, in my opinion, some indication from the co-Chairmen about the duration of the present session of the Conference would be helpful, especially to enable those of us who have other commitments to plan our programmes. In that connexion I should remind the Committee that we have a duty to report to the present session of the United Nations on the progress of our work here. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for that addition to my statement, but I thought that, after having obtained the acceptance of the Committee that the matter be raised today, I should let you know the results of our discussions.
19. The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I think the agreement of the representatives who have to come from Berne with regard to holding a meeting on 6 November will be generally appreciated. I thank the representative of Nigeria for his efforts in that regard.

^{1/} Circulated as document ENDC/202.

20. Mr. ECOBESCO (Romania) (translation from French): During the debates which have been going on for almost six years in this Committee the words that have been pronounced most often, like a Leitmotiv, have been "peace" and "security". That seems to us fully justified if we think of present-day international conditions and consequently of the tasks incumbent on the disarmament body; because the outcome of the efforts made here must be a true work of peace. Peace, however, as the famous Romanian politician and diplomat Nicolae Titulesco said, "is a vain word if it does not rest on the only foundation which can sustain a lasting peace and the name of which is 'security'". Those are words which have a more forceful meaning than ever if we consider how great a nuclear danger hangs over mankind.

21. The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons can have no other purpose than that of ensuring equal conditions of peace and security for all States. That concern is at the origin of the proposal contained in article III-B of the Romanian delegation's working paper, according to which -

"Nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty solemnly undertake never in any circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which undertake not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons". (ENDC/199, p.2)

In adhering to a non-proliferation treaty, each non-nuclear country has not only the right but the paramount duty towards its people to ensure that the commitment it has assumed concerning atomic non-armament does not in any circumstances lead to a diminution but, on the contrary, to a reinforcement of its security. In assuming such an obligation it is entirely justified that non-nuclear-weapon countries should receive appropriate guarantees that they will not become victims of nuclear attacks or of nuclear threats.

22. The question may be asked: Why write the undertaking of the nuclear Powers not to use atomic weapons into the operative part of the non-proliferation treaty? Because the non-nuclear States of the world are called upon by this very treaty to refrain definitively from manufacturing or acquiring weapons which, at least for the present, only some countries would continue to possess -- namely, the present nuclear Powers. It is therefore quite natural that States which renounce nuclear weapons should wish to see the interests of their future peaceful development assured and their feeling of security considerably enhanced by this treaty. The undertaking of the nuclear Powers not to use and not to threaten to use nuclear weapons -- a tangible reflexion of the principle of the balance of obligations and responsibilities -- is required by the very spirit of the non-proliferation treaty. In fact, the place which such an obligation has in the framework of the agreement is obvious.

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23. We are convinced that such a provision would perhaps constitute the most authentic and most eloquent proof of the desire of the nuclear States to disarm. It would be a first and indubitable indication that those who possess nuclear weapons do not contemplate using or threatening to use them against those who have agreed, through the non-proliferation treaty, not to manufacture or acquire such weapons.

24. The undertaking assumed by the nuclear Powers not to threaten and not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries would have for these the value of a triple shield -- juridical, political and moral. A juridical shield, because this obligation would translate into juridical terms a duty which the nuclear Powers would have to take into account; indeed, we believe in the value of accepted legal obligations. A political shield, because disregard, or merely attempted non-observance, of this obligation would provoke the prompt reaction of the machinery put into operation by the signatories to the treaty, with all its consequences. A moral shield, because the promotion of international ethics, the recognition of standards of conduct for States and governments in their external relations -- standards which, in spite of vicissitudes, are gaining more and more international ground -- would be invoked to impose mature reflexion, level-headedness and self-restraint.

25. Another aspect which we should like to point out is the strict conformity of our proposal with the Principles and basic standards of the United Nations Charter. In its Article 2, paragraph 4, the Charter lays down the fundamental Principle that all Members -

"... shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations".

The provision contained in our working paper does no more than apply a pre-existing general obligation to a particular case: that of nuclear weapons.

26. Assertions have been made during sessions of the General Assembly, -- and echoed here in our Committee -- that, since the Charter contains an obligation, its reiteration would be superfluous. We do not share that point of view -- quite the opposite. We consider that, since the Charter embodies that obligation, there should be no difficulty, no obstacle or the slightest hesitation about reaffirming it. To reiterate a provision -- in this case a standard accepted by all States which have subscribed to the United Nations Charter -- is not only to make it specific but also to reinforce it.

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27. Acceptance by the nuclear Powers, through the non-proliferation treaty, of the undertaking not to resort to the threat or use of nuclear weapons against countries which do not possess them would be in complete accord with the provisions of the Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear Weapons adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 24 November 1961 (resolution 1653 (XVI)).

28. Our proposal is also reflected in the provision of the working paper which we presented on 19 October concerning the obligation of the nuclear Powers to undertake specific disarmament measures, the two being closely interrelated. This is quite logical, since the supreme guarantee for ensuring peace and averting the nuclear threat consists, without any doubt, in cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and elimination of the material means of waging war -- namely nuclear armaments and their delivery vehicles.

29. This is the context in which we desire to emphasize the particular importance of the complete, integral implementation of the concept of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This requires that the withdrawal of all atomic weapons from the territories of other States, the liquidation of military bases on foreign territory, and the withdrawal of the troops within their own national boundaries should be carried out as one of the first steps in disarmament. Romania has consistently supported those measures both in this Committee and in other international bodies. In our opinion it is very difficult to reconcile the presence of nuclear weapons on the territory of other countries with the aims of the non-proliferation treaty.

30. Like all the other provisions in our working paper, the proposal to prohibit the threat to use nuclear weapons and the use of such weapons against non-nuclear States signatories to the treaty translates into legal terms Romania's desire to contribute effectively, in a spirit of sincere co-operation, to the improvement of the draft treaty before us so that the non-proliferation treaty may be an effective instrument of peace and security. It is our profound conviction that the inclusion in the treaty of the provisions which we propose would strengthen it by giving it durability and stability from the outset and making it void of loop-holes which might be used, perhaps soon after its entry into force, against the treaty itself.

31. The debates on the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, more particularly, those which have taken place in the Committee since the beginning of the year have had among other merits that of shedding a strong light on the manifold aspects of the peaceful uses of science, technology and nuclear energy. The many references to the peaceful use of the conquests which the twentieth century, called "the century of the atom", has placed within man's reach -- references which prove conclusively the

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efforts to study in depth and to elucidate completely the varied and complex implications of the agreement which we are preparing -- have rounded out the picture which has emerged from our explanations and have helped us to gain a better idea of the paths to be followed and the methods to be used if we wish the fruits of our work to be not only effective but also safe from all risks. I have in mind risks caused by errors, lack of precision and omissions.

32. Having spoken on 8 August I have already had the opportunity of stating succinctly (ENDC/PV.320) the fundamental position of the Romanian Government in regard to the problem of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The object of our statement today is to deal with that position at greater length in the light of the proposals contained in the working paper of the Romanian delegation.

33. What is the setting in which this problem should be placed? What are the essential factors on which this problem hinges?

34. We believe that, for a correct understanding and an adequate reply, it is necessary to take into account in the first place the present-day concern which in its urgency is equalled only by the need to safeguard international peace, and which in its magnitude stands level with the need for reinforcing general security. I am thinking of the development process in which most of the peoples of the world are today engaged. I refer to the efforts that have to be made by countries and whole continents in order to eliminate the phenomena and results of underdevelopment. I am thinking of the fulfilment of the peoples' aspirations to well-being and progress, of the flourishing of nations, and of access by all countries to the benefits of modern civilization.

35. Nor should the ever stronger impact of science and technology on economic growth escape our attention. The interaction of scientific, technical and economic development is known to have been a constant throughout the history of human civilization. In our time, however, science and technology, because of the unprecedented force and scope of the modern scientific movement, are among the decisive factors in man's economic and social progress. Hence the transformation of the economy through science appears to be a specific feature of modern society. Statistics show, as a more and more clearly visible trend, the growth throughout the world of the contribution of science and technology to the search for new solutions to the ever more numerous problems raised by economic development.

36. All this leads me to emphasize the special part which science, technology and nuclear energy can and must play in order to improve the human condition in general and, more particularly, to speed the growth of countries which are now set on development.

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Atomic energy, that remarkable discovery of man's genius, one of the most important and dynamic factors in the scientific and technical revolution of today, is continually revealing its own inexhaustible capacities, which can increase man's creative power in gigantic proportions and help to accelerate his progress. The peaceful use of nuclear energy in the most diverse activities has become an indispensable lever for the general economic and social advance of all countries.

37. The prospects which nuclear energy opens for the solution of the urgent problem of the world's power supply -- to mention only one example -- are full of meaning. Energy requirements increase in geometrical progression. Their factors are generally known: population growth, industrialization, development of agriculture, extension of transport, mechanization and automation of production, the raising of living levels, and so on. According to existing calculations the world's energy requirements double every seventeen to twenty years, its electric power requirements double every ten years, and the conventional sources of energy are insufficient, uneconomic, or in some regions running out.

38. It is thus easy to understand the present-day drive to harness the nuclear energy potential, the ever-growing reliance on that source of energy to meet the ever-increasing demands. In the United States, for example, by the end of this century the total installed electric generating capacity will be approximately 1.6 million MW compared with the present 250,000 MW, an increase of more than 600 per cent. It is estimated that the amount of electrical energy produced by United States nuclear power plants will be 30 per cent of the total production in 1980 and about 50 per cent towards the end of the century. In Western Europe the share of nuclear power plants in the total electricity production will be 30 per cent in 1980 and more than 40 per cent in 1985.

39. That is an extremely convincing illustration to show us why growing access to the peaceful use of nuclear energy is a vital condition for the economic development and technical progress of all the countries of the world.

40. I should now like to say a few words about the other side of the picture, to give us an idea of the magnitude and complexity of the very urgent tasks confronting most States of the world. I am referring to what might be called "the world of disparities and gaps." The fundamental data are well known, and that is precisely why I shall venture to recall only some of them.

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41. It seems to me that two examples will suffice to illustrate the economic gaps. Two-thirds of the world's population produces only 5 per cent of the world's industrial output; two-thirds of mankind do not receive in a year even one-third of the amount spent in a single month. Those facts reveal the economic gulf that separates the developing from the highly-industrialized countries.

42. Much has been said and is still being said about the scientific and technical gap between the Western countries. That gap exists; but can we ignore the much wider gap: that at present 95 per cent of all the world's scientific research is concentrated in about thirty countries and only 5 per cent is done in the rest? The cause of the gaps in energy consumption is that "Many parts of the world are now only beginning to enter the Electric Age". That is what we are told by the Chairman of the United States Nuclear Energy Commission, Mr. Glenn T. Seaborg (Meeting World Nuclear Fuel Requirements, Nuclear Engineering, February 1967, p.98).

43. Of the gap in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, here is an extremely edifying example. Fairly advanced studies have already been made for the establishment of integrated nuclear agro-industrial plants. According to preliminary estimates, such an entegrated plant would produce 1,000 MW of electricity and 1,500 million litres of drinking water daily, and quantities of ammonia and phosphates which would produce enough wheat to give millions of people an average ration of 2,400 calories a day all the year round. Such projects define their own dimensions; but many countries of the world have perhaps only reached the stage where they are beginning to open their first nuclear spelling-book.

44. What are the conclusions to be drawn from the picture I have just outlined? What requirements are imperative when we consider the draft treaty on non-proliferation?

45. A first fundamental requirement is that the non-proliferation treaty should not hamper access by non-nuclear countries to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Any restriction of their freedom to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes would condemn them to a serious industrial and scientific time-lag, and would infringe the inalienable right of every people to benefit fully from the great achievements of modern civilization. On the contrary, the treaty's provisions should guarantee to all countries the right and unlimited freedom, on a basis of equality and without any discrimination, to undertake research in that field and to use the achievements of nuclear science and technology for their peaceful development.

(Mr. Ecobesco, Romania)

46. That is the ground on which we propose the inclusion of the phrase "on the basis of equality" in article IV of the draft treaty. Full equality is required here, not for the purpose of atomic armament but to give all, without exception, the juridical framework necessary to enable them to benefit from the peaceful advantages of nuclear energy. Our proposal expresses the principle of the equality of right of all States, strict respect for which is a condition sine qua non for all international relations. An agreement of the scope of the non-proliferation treaty which did not faithfully reflect the principle of the sovereign equality of States would be inconceivable.

47. Similar reasons also underlie the new paragraph which we propose for inclusion in the preamble to the treaty. The substance of that paragraph consists in affirming clearly and unequivocally the absolute right of all States, whether they possess nuclear weapons or not, to undertake research on the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, both now and in the future, on the basis of equality and without any discrimination. The inclusion of the new paragraph in the preamble would concord the provisions of the preamble with those of article V. There is -- and we think this is clear to everyone -- a close, indissoluble link between the paragraph proposed by the Romanian delegation and article V of the operative part of the treaty.

48. The other fundamental requirement is that the non-proliferation treaty should establish by its provisions a legal basis for fruitful international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It goes without saying that this co-operation should be based on strict respect for the principles of sovereignty, equality and non-interference in internal affairs, and should give all countries access to the benefits of nuclear energy. That is why we propose amending the ninth preambular paragraph. We wish the words "Declaring their intention" to be replaced by the more precise and stronger phrase "Expressing their determination". It is also our wish that the international procedures for ensuring that the non-nuclear countries shall benefit from the advantages deriving from the peaceful use of nuclear explosions should be drafted with the participation of all States parties to the treaty. That is why we propose including in the ninth preambular paragraph a provision that those procedures shall be "accepted by all States signatories to the treaty". The adoption of that proposal would have a double effect: no non-nuclear country would be prevented from being a party to those procedures; and at the same time their terms, which would commit both nuclear and non-nuclear States, would be drawn up with the consent of all.

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49. The imperative need to do everything possible to reduce and finally bridge the economic, scientific and technological gap between the various countries entails the development of broad international co-operation within which everything relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy shall occupy a central place. In order that such co-operation may yield all its fruits and at the same time place within the reach of non-nuclear countries the entire range of benefits offered by science, technology and nuclear energy -- that great hope of mankind --, it must at all costs be free from any political, economic or other condition. All components of co-operation in the peaceful application of nuclear energy are subject to that primary requirement.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 344th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador E.L.M. Burns, representative of Canada.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Nigeria and Romania.

"The delegation of Nigeria tabled a working paper containing additions and amendments for inclusion in the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/202).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 6 November 1967, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.